



A New Framework for Patent Pool Licensing of SEPs

I. Proposal

Competition authorities and courts should recognize that for patent pools¹ that have reached a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market², a different approach on key issues in SEP licensing is appropriate, including on the determination of FRAND and of what constitutes “willingness” of the negotiating parties. The market’s broad acceptance of a patent pool’s standard license in consensual license transactions is the best evidence that the terms of the standard license are FRAND. Accordingly, once a patent pool has met a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market, the following framework should apply in analysis by courts and competition authorities of SEP licensing by that patent pool³:

- Once a patent pool has met a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market, the pool (and its SEP holders)⁴ are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that its rates and other licensing terms are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.

¹ We use the term “patent pool(s)” to denote only those collective licensing arrangements that comply with the guidance of antitrust agencies applicable to patent pools, and that are formed and run substantially in the manner described in these Comments. Thus, as used in this Framework, “patent pools” are those collective licensing arrangements that are formed and operated in a manner consistent with the guidance provided by the United States Department of Justice (“Department” or DoJ”) in the several favorable Business Review Letters it has issued relating to proposed patent pools (*see, e.g.*, 26 June 1997 letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, re request for a business review letter for licensing patents essential to compliance with the MPEG-2 video compression standard, found at <https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-trustees-columbia-university-fujitsu-limited-general-instrument-corp-lucent>; 10 June 1999 letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, re request for a business review letter for a pool licensing patents under the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video standards, found at <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/08/01/2485.pdf>), and that meet the “safe harbor” criteria summarized at pages 151-152 of the January 2021 Report of the SEPs Expert Group (“SEPs Expert Group Report”) found at <https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/45217> which in turn reference the European Commission’s Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements, found at <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/transfer.html>.)

² This standard is discussed further below at 9 -12.

³ Advance fully recognizes the significant obligations that apply to SEP holders as have been spelled out repeatedly and in detail in court decisions and policy statements by competition agencies.

⁴ Depending on the structure of a pool, the authority and legal ability to assert the pool’s patents against an infringer may be vested only in the individual SEP holders.

- In addition to the obligations set forth in the CJEU’s decision in *Huawei v ZTE*⁵ and other guidance from courts and competition agencies, to demonstrate “willingness” to take a FRAND license an implementer should have these initial obligations and responsibilities:
 - to determine whether there is a patent pool licensing SEPs for the standard it is practicing, and if there is, to educate itself about the patent pool and its offering by reviewing all the available information from such a patent pool; and then
 - to open negotiations for licenses for its practice of the standard by approaching each of the pool licensors or the patent pool either before, but no later than⁶ within a commercially reasonable time after, it first begins to make and sell products and/or services that practice the applicable standard.⁷
- If an implementer fails in those obligations and responsibilities:
 - The patent pool (and its SEP holders) should be entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the implementer is “unwilling.” Thereafter the implementer would have the burden of demonstrating the contrary to rebut the presumption, for example by demonstrating that it was unaware of the existence of the patent pool despite evidence of reasonable good faith efforts to learn of the pool’s existence,⁸ coupled with a clear record of other good faith efforts to become licensed to practice the standard such as initiating contact with the individual SEP holders in the pool; and
 - The patent pool (and its SEP holders) should be entitled to seek, and courts should have the ability to grant, an injunction against further infringement, taking into account all other relevant factors.
- Fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities noted above is necessary but not sufficient for an implementer to be characterized as a willing licensee.
 - After fulfilling the responsibilities described above, and to continue to be characterized as a willing licensee the implementer must continue to work

⁵ *Huawei v ZTE*, Case 2015-10-170/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:477 (July 16, 2015) found at <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=10325480>.

⁶ The timing indicated here would mean that a compliant implementer would initiate licensing discussions no later than when it begins to practice the standard, a fair and reasonable way to limit the period of unlicensed practice.

⁷ Note that these are the reciprocal of the responsibilities SEP negotiation guidelines routinely place on SEP holders in the bilateral context, *e.g.*, to determine which products of the implementer infringe which of its SEPs, and to provide sufficient information to the implementer to allow it to determine if it is infringing.

⁸ This standard for assessing the implementer’s claim that it was not aware of the pool’s existence is important to foreclose the possibility that the implementer’s purposeful ignorance could be used as indicating good faith when purposeful ignorance clearly is bad faith.

actively, and in good faith, in the same manner in which it would act in a commercial negotiation in which it sought to reach an agreement.⁹

- For example, even where an implementer fulfills its responsibilities both to educate itself about a relevant patent pool and also to initiate contact with the pool to obtain a license—or where the patent pool initiated contact with the implementer—the implementer would lose its status as “willing” if it then pursued a course of conduct indicating a policy of delay, or otherwise acted in a manner inconsistent with a good faith intent to attempt to conclude a license in the same manner it would in a commercial negotiation in which it sought to reach an agreement.
- In license negotiations with the patent pool, an implementer must start from the position that the patent pool’s rates and terms are FRAND. An implementer may try to establish that it is sufficiently different from every other patent pool licensee that the pool’s terms are not FRAND for it; but an implementer cannot begin negotiations as if starting from a blank slate—that is, as if the license terms had not already been validated—or simply reserve to itself the right to determine what is FRAND for the patent pool.¹⁰
- In any court proceeding between an implementer and a patent pool (or its SEP holders) where the patent pool has met a threshold of reasonably wide acceptance in the market the implementer would have the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption and the burden of convincing the tribunal that it has succeeded.
- If the implementer fails to meet its burden, the patent pool (or its SEP holders) should be entitled to seek, and courts should have the ability to grant, an injunction against further infringement, taking into account all other relevant factors as well.

II. Access Advance

Access Advance is an independent licensing administrator¹¹ leading the development, administration, and management of patent pools for licensing essential patents for inventions

⁹ Of course, the patent pool and/or its SEP holders also must continue to work actively and in good faith throughout the process, acting in the same manner in which it would act in pursuing a commercial opportunity in which it sought to reach an agreement.

¹⁰ “Huawei’s stance has always been that they are willing to enter into what Huawei contend is a FRAND licence. . . . Huawei have always reserved to themselves the right to determine what was FRAND at least in respect of the scope of the licence.” *Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd.* [2017] EWHC (Pat) 2988 (Birss J.) at ¶ 706.

¹¹ Access Advance provides a balanced, transparent, and efficient licensing mechanism for both patent owners and patent implementers. Access Advance currently manages and administers the HEVC Advance Patent Pool for licensing patents essential to H.265/HEVC technology, and the separate and independent VVC Advance Patent Pool for licensing essential patents to H.266/ VVC technology. The HEVC Advance Patent Pool and the VVC Advance Patent Pool are elements of the Access Advance Video Codec Platform Initiative, including the Multi-Codec Bridging Agreement that seamlessly incorporates HEVC and VVC technologies into a single discounted royalty rate structure with simplified reporting and payment obligations for Licensees whose products include both codecs.

underlying the most important standards-based video codec technologies. Since its launch in 2015, Advance’s HEVC patent pool (the “HEVC Advance patent pool”) has grown to include¹²:

- 39 licensors¹³ from the United States, Germany, Netherlands, China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, who are estimated collectively to hold
 - over 18,000 patents (determined by an independent technical expert to be essential patents for the H.265/HEVC Standard (HEVC SEPs))
 - in approximately 700 patent families
 - which we estimate to collectively account for more than 70% of all worldwide HEVC SEPs¹⁴
- and more than 260 licensees,¹⁵ comprising companies from a broad range of industries in the United States and in 29 other countries and territories including in Europe, Asia (Mainland China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan).

The licensors in the HEVC Advance patent pool represent a broad range of interests and incentives with regards to FRAND issues. They include both some who are “net licensees” in the sense that their financial incentives are primarily those of an implementer/licensee, and some who are “net licensors” in the sense that their financial incentives are primarily those of a SEP owner/licensor.

Many licensors are multinational operating companies that have made significant investments in the research and development of video codecs, which they have implemented in their products or services, including Google, Huawei, LG Electronics, Microsoft, Mitsubishi,

This innovation responds to the market’s desire for an even more efficient next-generation pool licensing structure. More information is available on our website at www.accessadvance.com.

¹² All data in this Framework are accurate as of the date of posting, June 8, 2022.

¹³ The list of current licensors is found at <https://accessadvance.com/hevc-advance-patent-pool-licensors/> and is updated as new licensors are added to the program. As part of our business-oriented approach to licensing, Access Advance offers a significant amount of information on its website <https://accessadvance.com> and we invite the reader to explore the site. Access Advance was the first—and to our knowledge is still the only—patent pool to offer a whitepaper analysis demonstrating that the pool’s terms are FRAND. The information offered on the site includes the full list of licensors and licensees, additional overview information for licensors and licensees, information on the terms and obligations of a licensor in the HEVC patent pool, a brief explanation of the technology behind the HEVC/H.265 video compression standard, an overview of the licensing program, a link to download an Excel spreadsheet listing the patents that have been evaluated essential along with an identification of the specific provisions of the standard on which one or more patent claims has been found essential, a description of the process for submitting patents for essentiality evaluation, branding guidelines, and patent marking guidelines, among other information.

¹⁴ A visual depiction of the data is found at <https://accessadvance.com/hevc-worldwide-patent-landscape/>.

¹⁵ The list of current licensees is found at <https://accessadvance.com/hevc-advance-patent-pool-licensees/> and is updated as new licensees are added to the program. It is worth noting that the ability to attract this large a number of willing licensees is common for patent pools, but less common in bilateral licensing.

Panasonic, Samsung, and SK Telecom. The HEVC Advance patent pool also includes many licensors who own a small number of patents but also contribute to the pool's royalty revenue as licensees, including Arris, Humax, OPPO, and ZTE. And, finally, the pool includes many licensors who have invested heavily in the research and development of video codecs where their primary purpose was to contribute their innovation to international standards and license those innovations, including GE, Fraunhofer, ETRI, and several research institutes and universities.

The diversity of the pool's licensors, both geographically and in terms of their economic interests, enables the HEVC Advance patent pool to achieve the critical balance of the interests of both rights holders and implementers necessary to build a successful patent pool based on the principles of FRAND. The benefits brought by such a broad base of licensors reflecting the balance of interests of rights holders and implementers underlies the pool's success in gaining wide market acceptance by implementers.

III. Determination of Essentiality

One of the hallmarks of a patent pool that satisfies our definitional criteria¹⁶ is the method by which it determines whether patents are essential. Such patent pools do not rely on patent holders' declarations of essentiality, which are well known to overstate the essentiality of their patents by anywhere from 20% to well above 50%.¹⁷ Instead, such patent pools retain one or more patent attorneys and technical experts to serve as independent evaluators¹⁸ to determine the essentiality of each of the candidate patent's claims. These evaluators have expertise in patent law in the relevant jurisdictions, in the standard for which licenses will be offered, in the technologies at issue, and in what "essentiality" means and why it matters. The evaluators are hired by the pool administrator as attorneys to the patent pool; the evaluators are not and do not act as attorneys for any potential licensor. The evaluators are compensated based on effort, not results; the compensation for each evaluation is not dependent on the outcome of any evaluation and is not dependent in any way on the number of patents determined to be essential.

¹⁶ See note 1, *supra*.

¹⁷ "An average essentiality ratio [of the share of actual SEPs among declared SEPs] somewhere between 25% and 40% seems realistic, with substantial variation between standards and portfolios." See SEPs Expert Group Report at 34-35. Similarly, the UK's Court of Appeal found: "Over-declaration is a substantial problem as illustrated by the judge's assessment that up to 72% of declared SEPs are not truly essential. . . [W]e recognise the existence of the practice of over-declaration and we acknowledge that it is a problem." *Unwired Planet Int'l Ltd v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd*, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (Lord Kitchen at ¶¶ 92, 96). See also, "Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents, Draft Revisions of May 2022 ("JPO SEP Negotiation Guide") found at "[Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents](#)" (PDF: 520KB), at 2, 13.

¹⁸ The evaluators' incentives for each evaluation are not related to the interests of the entity submitting patents for evaluation, but rather to the interests of the pool. Those include the incentive to ensure the accuracy of the evaluation results, which are integral to the overall health of the pool, for both business and legal reasons.

Only those patents with claims that have been evaluated as essential¹⁹ are included in the pool's list of essential patents, but all patents of the pool's licensors that are in fact essential are included in the patent pool license even if they are not included in the list of essential patents. The SEP owners who agree to be pool licensors agree to this principle in the documents by which they become pool licensors. Pool licensees are licensed to every essential patent of every pool licensor, even where a patent owner did not submit a patent or did not realize a particular patent was essential.

This provides each pool licensee with a license defense to an assertion of infringement of claims included in every essential patent of every pool licensor, even if a pool licensor asserts a patent not included on the pool's list of essential patents but which a court determines to be essential. This also means that as more SEP owners become pool licensors, and as patents continue to issue to pool licensors, all patents that are SEPs are automatically folded into the license. And the license granted by the patent pool continues to encumber the pool SEPs if they are sold, or any rights are assigned, to an entity that is not a pool licensor.²⁰

IV. Patent Pool Formation Results in Fair and Reasonable Rates and Terms

As the Japan Patent Office, the US Department of Justice, the US Federal Trade Commission, and the EU's SEPs Expert Group all have recognized, patent pools can reduce the transaction costs of multiple licensing negotiations and may mitigate royalty stacking and hold-up problems that can occur when multiple patent holders individually demand royalties from a licensee.²¹ At the most basic level, a patent pool enables an implementer to obtain a single license to a large number of patents in a single transaction, and to do so at royalty rates substantially lower than the cumulative rates of individual bilateral licenses to the same number of patents, as discussed further below. Those efficiencies and results are the direct product of the way patent pools are formed and in which they operate.

Finding the right participants

The formation of a patent pool begins with an effort to locate entities that likely own or otherwise have the right to license patents that likely include one or more essential claims.²²

¹⁹ The process of evaluating a patent claim is both intensive and expensive, commonly costing \$7,000 - \$10,000 per patent claim.

²⁰ The statements in this and the previous sentence are correct for many patent pools, *supra* note 1, including the Advance HEVC and VVC patent pools, but may not be correct for other patent pools, depending on their formation procedures and the contents of their formation documents and licenses.

²¹ U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property §5.5 (2017), available at <https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download>; see also SEPs Experts Report at 151-152; JPO SEP Negotiation Guide at 11, 40.

²² The determinations may be based on the pool administrator's technical investigation of the patents owned by the participants in the pool formation, or by evaluation of sample patents, or by the statement of participants that they have a good faith belief that they have or will have essential patents and the intention to form a patent pool they would join as licensors, or some combination of all of these.

This is a logical first step for a valid business reason: the success of the patent pool's business will be determined by its ability to attract implementers to take licenses, which will depend in large part on the SEP coverage and quality of the pool's offering. Therefore, to attract implementers once it begins offering licenses, the pool must first attract patent owners that can offer the volume and quality of SEP coverage implementers will want to license.

The overall goal of the formation process is finding consensus on patent license coverage, as well as on rates and other terms, that will incentivize large numbers of licensors and large numbers of licensees, with minimum friction, to agree to participate in the program. The very nature of a pool depends on finding terms that are mutually acceptable to implementers and innovators alike, with the goal that the vast majority of license transactions are consensual and not litigation driven.

Negotiating rates and terms

Pool formation done correctly brings together some owners of high quality SEPs with finances primarily driven by monetizing their IP through licensing, and others with finances primarily driven by monetizing their IP through selling compliant products, as well as some who monetize their IP through a combination of both methods. That group of likely SEP owners negotiates the royalty rate²³ and other licensing terms the pool will take to market.

The negotiation during pool formation simulates, and is a good proxy for, market negotiations between patent owners and implementers: both the "licensor-driven" and the "implementer-driven" models and incentives drive the process, ensuring a balance of interests between those business models. The resulting rate, therefore, is also a balance: likely somewhat lower than patent owners might like and somewhat higher than implementers might like, but acceptable to both as a fair compromise; that is the definition of a market rate that is fair and reasonable and is the rate that would prevail in a competitive market.²⁴

The basic business model of a pool is driven by efficiency concerns, one of which relevant here is removing friction from the licensing process. That motivates pools to be transparent in providing a great deal of very detailed information publicly on their websites so that

²³ In some cases, different rates are set for different categories of products, such as mobile devices, televisions, and other connected home devices. The discussion of "a rate" should be understood, where applicable, to mean "a rate for each product category" or as it is sometimes called "a rate card." This approach ensures that the rates reflect the different value the technology provides in different product categories, while ensuring non-discrimination among licensees within each product category. The negotiation during formation is for a rate (per category, where applicable) to license the entire package of patents. That is, the process is *not* that each patent holder states its desired royalty for its patents and then those individual rates are added together to calculate the total pool rate (per category, where applicable).

²⁴ "In patent pools, wide participation by rights holders and implementers may produce licensing terms that balance the interests of both, which may boost the efficiency of licensing negotiations compared to individual bilateral negotiations amongst multiple parties." JPO SEP Negotiation Guide, at 40.

prospective licensees can educate themselves even before engaging in discussions with the pool.

Those same efficiency concerns create an incentive to remove friction over the pool's rates. The mix of pool licensors with "rights holder incentives" and with "implementer incentives" drives the process to rates that are a compromise between those two sets of incentives; the efficiency incentives drive the process to rates at the lower end of that compromise to reduce pushback based on the pool's rates.

BDue to pool efficiencies, the royalty rate charged by a patent pool is substantially lower than the sum of what a licensee would pay for bilaterals to all the SEPs of all the pool licensors. Put another way, the "per unit" distribution each pool licensor receives from royalty revenue likely is substantially lower than the amount each licensor would receive "per unit" in bilateral licenses. In essence, pool licensors make the conscious decision to accept lower per-patent "unit rates" in return for a larger number of licensees; it is the classic tradeoff of unit price for volume. That tradeoff is a rational business decision justified by the pool's efficiencies. Therefore, in deciding to be a licensor in a patent pool, the patent owner is explicitly demonstrating that it is willing to forgo higher per unit revenue in favor of broader and more rapid implementation.

That tradeoff by pool licensors is consistent with the view of the pool as a business, and with the view that licensing is a sales activity, not a litigation activity. The "highest rate" makes the pool offer less attractive to potential licensees and therefore makes selling more difficult, which makes for longer sales cycles, which in turn makes sales more expensive, and therefore reduces both the rate of growth of the pool and the net royalty revenues distributed to the licensors. In addition, higher rates mean higher risk in the SEP licensing environment. All these consequences are contrary to the long-run business interests of the pool.

From the perspective of the SEP owners involved in forming a patent pool, a fair and reasonable rate is a rate that enables implementers to obtain a license at an acceptable price and that also fairly compensates patent owners for producing the inventions underlying the applicable standard and creating the essential patents that can be licensed in the pool, thus balancing the interests of licensors and licensees, as FRAND requires.²⁵

And from the perspective of a patent pool as a business—which includes approaching licensing as a sales activity—a reasonable royalty rate (and other reasonable licensing terms) result in less friction, and therefore shorter sales cycles, lower cost of sales, and lower risk. Reasonable rates and terms also result in more rapid and voluntary adoption by implementers, which in

²⁵ "[I]t is not correct to say that the FRAND undertaking is simply for the benefit of implementers. Its purpose is to strike a balance between the respective rights of patentees and implementers." *Unwired Planet v Huawei*, [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat), *supra* note 8, at ¶ 161. See also, e.g., ETSI Overview, found at <https://www.etsi.org/intellectual-property-rights>. ("The main objective of the ETSI IPR Policy is to balance the rights and interests of IPR holders to be fairly and adequately rewarded for the use of their SEPs in the implementation of ETSI standards and the need for implementers to get access to the technology defined in ETSI standards under FRAND terms and conditions.")

turn means that over a shorter time the pool will experience more licensees signing and higher total revenue.

V. Market test of FRAND

The test of whether the market regards the rates and other terms as FRAND is whether the rates and terms of the patent pool license are broadly—and willingly—accepted in the marketplace. The ideal economic evidence of the market’s assessment of contract rates and terms is conduct observed in the market in which the contract is offered. From an economic perspective, observed royalty rates reasonably broadly accepted in the market are the best indication of reasonable royalty rates for a portfolio of patents. The best test of whether rates and terms reflect what the market would find FRAND and therefore acceptable is whether the rate and terms are in fact accepted in the marketplace.

A fundamental point of our proposed Framework is the need for recognition that once a patent pool has achieved a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market, the rates and other licensing terms of the pool should be presumptively seen as FRAND, since that broad acceptance is the best empirical evidence on the issue. As the Dusseldorf Regional Court has observed:

It should be noted in this context that a mathematically exact derivation of a FRAND-compliant license fee is not necessary; the acceptance of the required license rates on the market must be sufficiently demonstrated by means of license agreements already concluded (LG Dusseldorf, judgement of 13 July 2017, 4a O 154/15, marginal no. 311, quoted according to juris). The presentation of already concluded contracts has priority. It is easier to prove the FRAND standard by means of the results of different, already successful license agreements and to determine it more reliably than by presenting individual factors which can or should play a more or less important role in license agreement negotiations (LG Dusseldorf, Judgement of 13 July 2017, 4a O 154/15, para. 311, cited by juris). 13 July 2017, 4a O 154/15, para. 311, quoted according to juris).²⁶

²⁶ See page 55 of the decisions by Landgericht Düsseldorf in 2020 in each of three infringement cases, one brought by Philips, one by GEVC, and one by Dolby, against MAS Elektronik Aktiengesellschaft, in which the court issued three detailed judgments, dated May 7, 2020 (the "MAS judgment"). Those decisions found that the rates and terms of the HEVC Advance Patent Pool were FRAND, found that MAS had infringed each of the pool licensors’ asserted patents, and granted an injunction against further infringement by MAS. See, e.g., GE v. MAS, Landgericht Düsseldorf [LG] [Düsseldorf Regional Court] May 14, 2020, 4c O 56/18 (Ger.)

The Dusseldorf District Court issued rulings on December 21, 2021 in a set of cases involving Vestel’s infringement of HEVC essential patents held by four licensors in the HEVC Advance Patent Pool. The Court found that Vestel infringed four of the HEVC essential patents asserted against it, ordered Vestel to render accounts about its sale of infringing products in Germany on these patents and found Vestel liable for damages to be calculated as FRAND license fee. The two other cases were stayed pending nullity proceedings (which German Courts regularly only do if

The determination of what constitutes reasonably broad acceptance of the pool's rates and terms such that they are presumptively FRAND may depend on the particular facts. But whatever may be the minimum number we suggest it is certainly not 260 and almost certainly not 100 or even 50.²⁷

As an example, the HEVC Advance patent pool license has been accepted broadly by the market, with more than 260 licensees having signed a license voluntarily based on negotiations, and without litigation.²⁸ A review of Advance's licensee list also demonstrates that our license has been accepted by implementers across a broad range of industry groups including those who account for half or more²⁹ of sales (by volume) in key market segments:

- 53% of the mobile and tablet market
- 88% of the set-top-box market
- 55% of the UHD television market

the Court is internally convinced that the patents are infringed). None of the six complaints has been rejected by the first instance Court and the cases that have not been stayed are now pending in appeal proceedings.

The court did not grant injunctive relief, destruction and recall, based on an issue raised by Vestel about Access Advance's policy on duplicate royalty payments. When Vestel became a licensee of the MPEG LA HEVC Advance Patent Pool in 2018, some licensors in the HEVC Advance Patent Pool are or formerly also were licensors in the MPEG LA HEVC pool, including the 13 Licensors that subsequently left the MPEG LA pool.

It is Access Advance's position that its prior Duplicate Royalty Policy and Duplicate Royalty Implementation Process followed — and was more favorable to licensees than — long-standing industry practice and is widely accepted and utilized by other HEVC Advance Patent Pool licensors as well as hundreds of licensees and licensors in other patent pools. Nevertheless, the Court found that as to Vestel this practice was not FRAND because of the significant number of overlapping patents to which Vestel was licensed, ruling that the policy (i) did not impose a legal obligation on Access Advance directly with Vestel to assure that the licensor did not receive a duplicate royalty payment and (ii) did not provide adequate specificity to Vestel prior to license execution on the methodology each licensor would apply to prevent such duplicate receipt of royalties by licensors.

The Court's ruling in the MAS cases that the HEVC Advance Patent Pool rates are FRAND were not questioned in the Vestel decision and Access Advance has modified its duplicate royalty policy to address the Court's concerns.

²⁷ The Düsseldorf Regional Court has found that 12 license agreements were sufficient evidence to prove the existence of an established royalty for the patents in suit. (Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone, Case No. 4a O 73/14, Landgericht [LG] Düsseldorf [Düsseldorf Regional Court] 31 March 2016 (Ger.)). More recently, the Court found that 40 license agreements were sufficient to prove the existence of an established royalty for the patents in suit. (Dolby Int'l AB v. MAS Elektronik Aktiengesellschaft, Case No. 4c O 44/18 Landgericht [LG] Düsseldorf [Düsseldorf Regional Court] 7 May 2020 (Ger.)) Note also that Presiding Judge Dr. Thomas Kühnen of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf has reasoned in his treatise on patent litigation that every license agreement for a given set of patents is market evidence of a reasonable royalty for those patents, and that the indication of an established royalty further crystallizes with every additional license. (Thomas Kühnen, *Handbuch der Patentverletzung* [Patent Litigation Proceedings in Germany: A Handbook for Practitioners] § I.III.3 ¶ 2609 (Frank Peterreins trans., Wolters Kluwer 7th ed. 2014)).

²⁸ Only two licensees were involved in litigation before signing a license; all other licensees signed after discussions and with no litigation.

²⁹ Percentages are based on share of all HEVC-enabled devices (by volume) sold in the market.

- 80% of the drone market
- 45% of the surveillance market.

These licensees include the top brands and companies by volume:

- In the smartphone market, 6 out of the top 10 smartphone brands (Samsung, OPPO, Realme, Vivo, Huawei, and Honor), the No.1, No. 2, and No. 5 smartphone companies (Samsung, OPPO, and Vivo) worldwide
- In the set top box market, 9 out of the top 10 vendors worldwide (Skyworth, Technicolor, ZTE, Arris, Sagemcom, Jiuzhou, Kaon Media, Humax, and Changhong)
- In the UHD TV market, 3 out of the top 5 brands (including Samsung and LG) worldwide
- In the game console market, 2 out of the top 3 companies (including Microsoft)

Not only is the HEVC Advance patent pool widely accepted in these markets involving a large volume of consumer devices, the pool also is accepted by market leaders in non-consumer markets, including GE (aircraft and medical), Boeing (defense and aircraft), Honeywell (defense and security), Bosch (industrial and security), Hitachi (industrial), and DJI (drones).

Similar to the diverse interests of the pool licensors, Advance’s HEVC patent pool licensees also represent a broad spectrum of interests with regard to FRAND. And while some licensees are also licensors, most licensees are not licensors, as is clear from the numbers.³⁰ The pool licensees include, for example:

- large licensees (as measured by volume) who are also large licensors, *e.g.*, Canon, Microsoft, Samsung, LG, Huawei, *etc.*³¹
- large licensees (as measured by volume) who are small licensors, *e.g.*, Google, Arris, ZTE, Humax, OPPO
- large licensees who are not licensors, *e.g.*, Vivo, Technicolor, Sagemcom, Honor, Skyworth
- small and medium-size licensees who are large licensors, *e.g.*, JVCKENWOOD, Panasonic, Mitsubishi

³⁰ Advance requires that any patent pool licensor who is also an implementer must also become a patent pool licensee, signing the same license agreement signed by every other licensee. Note also that the fact that the Access Advance HEVC pool includes 39 licensors and more than 260 licensees means, by definition, that the vast majority of licensees are not also licensors.

³¹ A “large” licensee is one who makes and sells a large volume of product and therefore pays a large amount of total royalties. These companies are “net licensees” in the sense that their financial incentives are primarily those of an implementer/licensee. A “large” licensor is one who has a large patent portfolio of SEPs, and therefore receives a large amount of the distribution of royalties within the pool. These companies are “net licensors” in the sense that their financial incentives are primarily those of a SEP owner/licensor. Note that some are both large licensors and large licensees; their financial incentives are balanced between licensor and licensee incentives.

- small and medium-size licensees who are small licensors, *e.g.*, Humax, Philips, NEC, Warner Bros, and
- small and medium-size licensees who are not licensors, *e.g.*, D-Link, Fujifilm, Hitachi, Logitech, Nikon, Telekom Deutschland, and many more.

Given the broad acceptance of the Access Advance HEVC patent pool by implementers across industries and geographies, it is reasonable to conclude that the licensee market has determined that the pool license is fair and reasonable and non-discriminatory.

Once a pool has met a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market it would be unreasonable to analyze that pool's license offer on a blank slate, as if it were being offered for the first time. Instead, competition authorities and courts should consider that it would be reasonable to assume, and courts would be entitled to afford the pool license a rebuttal presumption, that its terms are FRAND. Of course, such a presumption would not preclude an implementer from challenging that conclusion in court, but it would mean that the burden is on the implementer to rebut by clear evidence the presumption that the pool license is FRAND.

Competition authorities adopting such an approach also may want to offer some guidance about the threshold of acceptance at which it would be reasonable to assume, and appropriate for a court to determine, that the pool's license terms are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they are FRAND. The appropriate threshold, for example, might be based on the number of licensees or the number of licensees combined with some analysis of how representative the licensees are of the universe of implementers.³² Or a competition authority may simply suggest that a court would be entitled to set the parameters under which it might determine that the pool's license is entitled to such a rebuttable presumption.

V. The rebuttable presumption and “willingness”

Adopting our proposal also would be helpful in achieving the policy objectives of various government agencies that have provided guidance on SEP licensing. These include: encouraging good faith negotiations between an unlicensed implementer and a patent pool, as noted by the United States Department of Justice, Patent and Trademark Office, and National Institute of Standards (“the US Agencies”);³³ the goals of the European Commission in issuing its Call for Evidence for the Initiative on Intellectual Property – New Framework for Standard-Essential Patents, which noted that an effective intellectual property (‘IP’) framework needs to strike a balance between promoting innovation by protecting IP on the one hand and not blocking

³² See discussion at 8, above, and note 27.

³³ Draft Policy Statement on Licensing Negotiations and Remedies For Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, offered by The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (DOJ) (December 6, 2021) (“Draft Policy Statement”) (available at <https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1453826/download>) at 8.

companies' access to IP and to the single market on the other;³⁴ and the Japan Patent Office in issuing its Draft Guide to Licensing Negotiations involving Standard Essential Patents, which notes that it “aims to enhance transparency and predictability, facilitate negotiations between rights holders and implementers, and help prevent or quickly resolve disputes concerning the licensing of standard essential patents.”³⁵

For example, if competition authorities suggest that at some level of acceptance the pool license is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it is FRAND, then in licensing negotiations the burden should be on the implementer to rebut that presumption with evidence that the license is not FRAND as to itself, even though it is FRAND for a large number of licensees.³⁶

The US Agencies have noted the potential loss of competition that can arise from an implementer's unwillingness to accept a F/RAND license or—rather than refusing outright, which no intelligent infringer would do—to delay licensing negotiations in bad faith:

[W]hen standards implementers are unwilling to accept a F/RAND license or delay licensing negotiations in bad faith, these strategies can lessen patent holders' incentives to participate in the development process or contribute technologies to standards voluntarily. Without adequate incentives to contribute to a consensus-based process, patent holders may opt for closed, proprietary standards that do not offer the same benefits of interoperability and enhanced consumer choice.³⁷

In the context of a patent pool license that has met whatever benchmark is appropriate to conclude that it is presumptively FRAND and yet is not accepted by the 50th or the 100th, or for that matter the 261st implementer, we suggest it would be appropriate for competition authorities to consider what would be the right approach to preserving the incentives for innovation that encouraged the dozens of SEP holders in the pool to invest both the resources in R&D as well as the resources in the years-long effort to form the pool.³⁸

³⁴ Call for Evidence for the Initiative on Intellectual Property – New Framework for Standard-Essential Patents (“Call for Evidence”), at 1 (available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-standard-essential-patents_en).

³⁵ JPO “Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents” (“Guide”) at 1.

³⁶ The rebuttable presumption also would be helpful in identifying an important exception to the Draft Policy Statement view that “[a]s a general matter, consistent with judicially articulated considerations, monetary remedies will usually be adequate to fully compensate a SEP holder for infringement.” Draft Policy Statement, *supra* note 31, at 8.

³⁷ Draft Policy Statement, *supra* note 33, at 4.

³⁸ For a discussion of several issues common to both where the “SEP holder” is a single entity and where it is a patent pool, including issues of hold-up, hold-out, and the adequacy of monetary damages, see, e.g., Jeffrey Blumenfeld, *Should FRAND Excuse “Efficient Infringement”?*, 5 Criterion J. on Innovation 143 (2020), found at <https://www.criterioninnovation.com/articles/blumenfeld-should-frand-excuse-efficient-infringement.pdf>.

An “implementer” is—by definition—an entity that is already actively practicing the standard, selling products and/or services that practice the standard. An unlicensed implementer therefore is—again by definition— infringing SEPs that read on the standard.³⁹ Ongoing infringement by implementers who are or should be⁴⁰ well aware of the availability of a patent pool license that has met the threshold to be entitled to a presumption that it is FRAND, should be among the “individual circumstances of licensing negotiations between patent holders and potential licensees [that] will affect the appropriate remedy for infringement of a valid and enforceable SEP,”⁴¹ that is, among the criteria used to determine whether an implementer is “willing.”

Much has been written about the issue of “willingness” of the potential licensee as an integral part of the implementer’s ability to raise a FRAND defense to infringement litigation brought by SEP holders. That issue was further clarified by two decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, generally referred to as the Federal Court of Justice, or “FCJ” in English) in the *Sisvel v. Haier* litigation.⁴²

In the case of a standard-essential patent, lower requirements do not result from the fact that the patent proprietor, who has submitted a declaration of willingness to take a licence, has only limited leverage to enforce the IP right, if necessary by taking legal action . . . and is dependent on concluding licence agreements for the economic exploitation of his patent. On the contrary, the patent infringer may not exploit this structural disadvantage for the purpose of “patent hold-out” . . . without exposing himself to the accusation of dishonest conduct. Otherwise, the restriction of the enforceability of the patent by legal action for the purpose of avoiding an abuse of market power would lead to another distortion of the conditions of competition in that the patent infringer could obtain an unjustified advantage over

³⁹ See, e.g., “When patents are SEPs and the details of patent claims are consistent with standards documents, and if the implementers advertise that their products conform to the applicable standards, the act of indicating the correspondence between patent claims and standards may be sufficient. Thus, mapping patent claims to actual products may not always be necessary.” JPO SEP Negotiation Guide at 12. “In *Fujitsu v. Netgear* (U.S., CAFC, 2010), the court stated that if an accused product operates in accordance with the standards, then comparing the claims to the standard is the same as comparing the claims to the accused product.” JPO SEP Negotiation Guide at 12, note 23. Access Advance’s website, for example, allows anyone to see a list of the patents in the pool that have been determined essential by the patent evaluator, and for each patent the specific portions of the standard on which claims of the patent were determined by the patent evaluator to be essential.

⁴⁰ See discussion of this issue in this Response above at note 8 and accompanying text.

⁴¹ Draft Policy Statement, *supra* note 30, at 7.

⁴² *Sisvel v. Haier II*, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] November 24, 2020, KZR 35/17, (Internal citations omitted, spellings retained) (English translation found at <https://www.katheraugenstein.com/en/federal-court-of-justice-frand-defence-ii>). The German courts have been the venue of a large volume of SEP litigation over the past several years, with cases filed both by SEP holders against implementers, and by implementers against SEP holders. As a result the German courts have had repeated opportunities to examine in detail the behavior of both SEP holders and implementers in the negotiations that led to the litigation.

those competitors who have to seek a licence in due time and therefore pay the appropriate remuneration for the use of standard-essential patents.⁴³

The FCJ went on to further elaborate on the concept of “willingness” and how an implementer must conduct itself throughout the negotiations to retain the status of a “willing licensee”⁴⁴ which is worth reviewing at some length:

Contrary to the defendant's view, the declaration of willingness to take a licence is thus not a "mere gateway" for the start of the actual negotiations, even according to the case law of the European Court of Justice. Rather, the continued willingness to take a licence is an indispensable prerequisite for successful licensing negotiations and thus also for the accusation of abuse of market power against the patent proprietor in the event of their failure. This is also clear from the context of the Huawei/ZTE decision.

The guidelines formulated by the Union Court are based on a proposal by Advocate General Wathelet. This was based on the assumption that an abuse [of dominance defence] can only be considered against a patent infringer who is objectively ready, willing and able to enter into a FRAND licence agreement

Incidentally, this is also in line with the Commission's view in a decision preceding the decision of the Court of Justice of the Union, in which the Commission expresses that the patent proprietor may seek and enforce an injunction against a potential licensee if the latter is unwilling to enter into a FRAND agreement

Such an objective willingness to conclude a FRAND licence agreement is regularly demonstrated, according to the business practices recognised in all areas of economic life and also emphasised by the European Court of Justice as decisive, by the active promotion of negotiations oriented towards the common goal of a successful conclusion. The negotiation steps of parties interested in concluding a contract build on each other. A duty to promote therefore always exists if and insofar as the next negotiation step is to be expected according to business practice and the principles of good faith⁴⁵

⁴³ *Id.* at ¶ 61 (internal citations omitted).

⁴⁴ “[S]imply satisfying the various elements noted in this Guide provides no guarantee of recognition of good faith. Rather, a comprehensive assessment of the negotiating process as a whole needs to be made in each case.” JPO SEP Negotiation Guide at 10.

⁴⁵ *Id.* at ¶ 68 (internal citations omitted) (additional paragraph breaks added).

The German courts and the UK courts⁴⁶ have been venues for significant SEP litigation over the past several years, resulting in repeated opportunities to examine in detail the behavior of both SEP holders and implementers in the negotiations that led to the litigation. Therefore, they have been well-placed to present fact-based conclusions about the occurrence of hold-up and hold-out. Courts in both countries have recognized that under current FRAND rules and policies, hold-out by implementers can be a viable strategy, and therefore that an implementer loses its status as “willing” and its FRAND defense if it engages in hold-out. Yet—to our knowledge—no court or government agency with jurisdiction over SEP and FRAND issues has considered the particular meaning of “willingness” in the context of licensing between an implementer and a patent pool rather than in the context of bilateral licensing in which each of the patent holder and the implementer is a single company. The differences of the patent pool context should be relevant to the competition authorities and courts in determining how best to “encourage parties . . . in pursuit of such negotiation”⁴⁷ to act in conformance with F/RAND obligations.

As with all guidance from agencies and courts around the world, the CJEU decision in *Huawei v ZTE* held that the first step in SEP licensing negotiation should be taken by the patent holder, to notify the implementer that the patent holder owns or controls SEPs that the implementer is likely infringing.⁴⁸ This is logical and reasonable in the context of an individual SEP holder. It is possible that the implementer may not be aware that a particular entity is a patent holder, or that its patents are SEPs, or that the implementer is infringing those SEPs. That may even be particularly true when the patents are SEPs, because there are likely to be dozens of entities that own SEPs for whatever standard or standards the implementer’s devices or services practice.

But that guidance should be modified in the context of a patent pool because the underlying assumption that the implementer is unaware of the existence of the relevant patent pool is neither logical nor reasonable and is unlikely to be correct. Rather, we suggest, it is highly likely that an implementer is—and in any event should be⁴⁹—aware of the existence of a patent pool for the standard in question, and, thanks to the internet, can easily discover a great deal of relevant information about the pool and its licensing program. Moreover, the implementer likely is—and in any event should be—be aware of the patent pool’s process for independent evaluation of essentiality and should recognize that it offers an assurance that a licensee does

⁴⁶ For UK court decisions that have recognized the reality of the hold-out strategy in addition to those cited elsewhere in this Framework proposal see, e.g., *Optis v Apple* [2021] EWHC 2564 (Pat), at ¶ 72 *et seq.* (Meade J) (drawing on the multiple *Unwired Planet* decisions of the UK courts).

⁴⁷ Draft Policy Statement, *supra* note 31, at 5.

⁴⁸ *Huawei v ZTE*, *supra*, at par. 51.

⁴⁹ See discussion of this issue in this Response above at n. 8 and accompanying text.

not normally have in a bilateral negotiation, where, as courts have observed, the implementer is dependent on the licensor's unilateral declaration of whether patents are essential.⁵⁰

As an example, by navigating to the website of the Advance HEVC patent pool and following the links provided to the additional relevant pages of the website,⁵¹ an implementer can—among other relevant information—see a list of the patents in the pool that have been determined essential by the patent evaluator, can see for each patent the specific portions of the standard on which claims of the patent were determined by the patent evaluator to be essential, can see the list of licensors, can see the list of licensees, can obtain and examine a White Paper explaining why the pool's rates are FRAND⁵², and can request an exemplar copy of the pool license to review.

Simply put, in the context of patent pools, patent licensing should not be the only market in which the customer has no responsibility to approach the seller before taking and using the seller's property, and instead the only market in which the customer is instead entitled to take, use, and profit from the seller's property without any affirmative effort to pay or even to negotiate to pay⁵³ and the only market in which the customer further is entitled to demonstrate "willingness" simply by claiming that it is willing to engage in a discussion once it has been tracked down and confronted.

The proposition that a patent pool that has reached a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market should be entitled to a presumption that its rates and terms are FRAND should inform the negotiation between a patent pool and an implementer from the earliest stages and throughout the negotiation. For example, however the negotiation is

⁵⁰ "There is no 'quality control' by independent third parties [to assure true essentiality of declared SEPs], unless the patents in question are examined in litigation *or by a person assigned by a patent pool*. . . . Some stakeholders and observers have criticised the existing assessments as inherently unreliable, citing, for example, e.g. the limited workload allocated to the assessment of each patent as compared to the *substantially more thorough essentiality assessment carried out by patent pools* or during litigation for the patents under dispute." Call for Evidence at 2 (emphasis added).

⁵¹ <https://accessadvance.com/licensing-programs/hevc-advance/>.

⁵² Advance was the first patent pool—and to our knowledge is still the only—patent pool to offer such an analysis on its website. Ours was first posted in 2018.

⁵³ As Mr. Justice (now Lord Justice) Birss observed:

The implementers can and do implement the inventions the subject of SEPs simply by making standards compliant equipment. Unlike a market for goods or services, what the implementer actually wants is something it has ready access to, namely information, all of which is freely available in the standards. Normally a seller of a product can restrict practical access to his or her goods without payment just by refusing to sell them. The holder of an intellectual property right like a SEP cannot do that. That is of course why the right to exclude given by the injunction plays such a significant part of intellectual property disputes, because it is the means by which the law seeks to put the intellectual property owner into the analogous position to an owner of tangible property such as a product or land.

Unwired Planet Int'l Ltd v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat), *supra* note 8, at ¶ 658.

initiated—whether by the implementer fulfilling its responsibilities to educate itself and proactively initiate contact with the pool, or by the pool reaching out to the implementer—it would be unreasonable for the implementer’s opening position to be that the pool’s rates and terms are not FRAND, or that there is no existing benchmark for the pool’s rates, or that the first step should be that the patent pool must “prove” to the implementer that its rates and terms are FRAND.⁵⁴ Without clear and convincing evidence that the implementer’s situation is materially distinct from the situations of the existing pool licensees and warrants different rates and terms, the articulation by an implementer of any of these positions should be seen as bad faith and evidencing an intent to delay, by which an implementer loses its status as “willing.”

The “alleged infringer”—in the words of the CJEU—has the obligation “diligently to respond” to a specific written offer from the SEP holder.⁵⁵ It is important to note that, in our experience, failing to respond in a timely manner is both the most obvious and least frequent method by which implementers act to delay the process (when that is their purpose) and thereby extend their period of non-paid infringement. Rather, implementers intent on delay engage in more sophisticated tactics, such as the ones described above. Or they continue to inquire about issues well-explained in the material available to them on the website, or about issues explained to them in detail in prior meetings. In our experience, perhaps the most common tactic for delay by implementers is to mimic the actions of a willing licensee but without the intentions: they correspond, they meet—even, perhaps, on a regular basis—but without any intent or even desire to reach an agreement, and certainly evidencing no urgency to do so.

Courts have observed that the challenge facing a SEP holder in such a situation is that the only available approach to obtaining signed licenses from infringing implementers is to seek them out one-by-one, file patent infringement cases against them one-by-one, spend the time and resources over the years necessary to achieve a verdict of infringement in each case, spend more time and resources defending an appeal of the infringement verdict, and if ultimately successful, then be entitled to money damages.⁵⁶ After pursuing that course for, say the 50th or the 100th or for that matter the 261st infringing implementer, the SEP holder would then turn to the 51st or the 101st or the 262nd and so on. Of course, some number of infringing implementers could be litigated against simultaneously, but that simply raises the level of resources that must be expended simultaneously. And if the money damages for past practice must be calculated by applying FRAND rates to the volume of past practice, the attractiveness

⁵⁴ In our experience those are among the most common position that were taken, and continue to be taken, by implementers—all of whom claimed to be following the mandates of the case—after the CJEU decision in *Huawei v ZTE*, *supra*.

⁵⁵ *Id.* at paras. 63, 65.

⁵⁶ It is worth noting that hold-out by implementers, especially large companies, encourages hold-out by other implementers, large and small, and that money damages to the SEP holders do not address the fact that many other companies that compete with the hold-out implementers recognized their obligation to be licensed and paid royalties throughout the time others have been engaged in hold-out. *See, e.g., Should FRAND Excuse “Efficient Infringement”?*, *supra* note 34, at 151-152.

to implementers of, and the incentives of implementers to pursue, the hold-out strategy are readily apparent.

It is worth considering at length the discussion of this issue by the UK Supreme Court:

[I]n a case of the present kind, an award of damages is unlikely to be an adequate substitute for what would be lost by the withholding of an injunction. The critical feature of a case of this kind is that the patent is a standard technology for products which are designed to operate on a global basis. That is why standard technology is essential, and why the patent-holders whose patents are accepted as SEPs are required to give an undertaking that licences will be made available on FRAND terms. Once the patents have been accepted as SEPs, it may well be impractical for the patent-holder to bring proceedings to enforce its rights against an infringing implementer in every country where the patents have been infringed. That is because, as Huawei's witness Mr Cheng accepted in evidence, the cost of bringing enforcement proceedings around the world, patent by patent, and country by country, would be "impossibly high".

In those circumstances, if the patent-holder were confined to a monetary remedy, implementers who were infringing the patents would have an incentive to continue infringing until, patent by patent, and country by country, they were compelled to pay royalties. It would not make economic sense for them to enter voluntarily into FRAND licences. In practice, the enforcement of patent rights on that basis might well be impractical, as was accepted in the present case by Huawei's witness, and by the courts below. An injunction is likely to be a more effective remedy, since it does not merely add a small increment to the cost of products which infringe the UK patents, but prohibits infringement altogether. In the face of such an order, the infringer may have little option, if it wishes to remain in the market, but to accept the FRAND licence which *ex hypothesi* is available from the patent-holder. However, for the reasons explained in paras 164-165, that does not mean that the court is enabling the patent-holder to abuse its rights.

This point was understood by the courts below. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Kitchin observed at paras 55-56:

"It may be wholly impractical for a SEP owner to seek to negotiate a licence of its patent rights country by country, just as it may be prohibitively expensive for it to seek to enforce those rights by litigating in each country in which they subsist. This latter point was accepted by Mr Cheng in the course of his evidence: he agreed that the costs of such litigation for [Unwired] would be impossibly high ... [I]t seems to us, at least as a matter of principle, that there may be circumstances in which it would not be fair and reasonable to expect a SEP owner to negotiate a licence or bring

proceedings territory by territory and that in those circumstances only a global licence or at least a multi-territorial licence would be FRAND.”.

Lord Kitchin also noted at para 111 the implications of accepting Huawei’s contention that country-by-country licensing was appropriate:

“The patentee must then bring proceedings country by country to secure the payment of the royalties to which it is entitled. But unlike a normal patent action, where an unsuccessful defendant faces the prospect of an injunction, the reluctant licensee would know that, on the assumption it could only be required to take licences country by country, there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted against it provided it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities in any particular country once those activities had been found to infringe. So it would have an incentive to hold out country by country until it was compelled to pay.”

That reasoning was criticised by Huawei, but far from being erroneous, it identifies the central reason why an injunction is necessary in order to do justice, and why damages in lieu would not be an adequate substitute.⁵⁷

Therefore, once a patent pool has reached a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market, the rebuttable presumption that a patent pool’s rates and terms are FRAND should apply at the earliest stages of negotiations and throughout any litigation, unless and until the implementer has successfully rebutted the presumption as determined by a court in the event of litigation between the parties; the patent pool (or its SEP holders) should be entitled to request and a court should be entitled to consider granting an injunction.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

Our proposed New Framework for Patent Pool Licensing of SEPs recognizes that a different approach on key issues is appropriate for patent pools that have reached a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market, including on issues such as the determination of FRAND and of implementer “willingness.” Our New Framework will result in less hold-out, even more rapid and widespread adoption, and even lower transaction costs; therefore in a more level playing field with less distortion of downstream competition.

The market’s reasonably broad acceptance of a patent pool’s standard license in consensual license transactions is the best evidence that the terms of the standard license are FRAND. Accordingly, competition authorities and courts should recognize that once a patent pool has reached a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market, in addition to any

⁵⁷ *Unwired Planet v Huawei*, [2020] UKSC 37, at ¶¶ 166-169.

obligations that apply to patent pools (and all SEP holders), the following New Framework should apply:

- Once a patent pool has met a threshold of reasonably broad acceptance in the market, the pool (and its SEP holders)⁵⁸ are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that its rates and other licensing terms are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.
- In addition to the obligations set forth in the CJEU’s decision in *Huawei v ZTE*⁵⁹ and other guidance from courts and competition agencies, to demonstrate “willingness” to take a FRAND license an implementer should have these initial obligations and responsibilities:
 - to determine whether there is a patent pool licensing SEPs for the standard it is practicing, and if there is, to educate itself about the patent pool and its offering by reviewing all the available information from such a patent pool; and then
 - to open negotiations for licenses for its practice of the standard by approaching each of the pool licensors or the patent pool either before, but no later than⁶⁰ within a commercially reasonable time after, it first begins to make and sell products and/or services that practice the applicable standard.⁶¹
- If an implementer fails in those obligations and responsibilities:
 - The patent pool (and its SEP holders) should be entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the implementer is “unwilling.” Thereafter the implementer would have the burden of demonstrating the contrary to rebut the presumption, for example by demonstrating that it was unaware of the existence of the patent pool despite evidence of reasonable good faith efforts to learn of the pool’s existence,⁶² coupled with a clear record of other good faith efforts to become licensed to practice the standard such as initiating contact with the individual SEP holders in the pool; and

⁵⁸ Depending on the structure of a pool, the authority and legal ability to assert the pool’s patents against an infringer may be vested only in the individual SEP holders.

⁵⁹ *Huawei v ZTE*, Case 2015-10-170/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:477 (July 16, 2015) found at <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=10325480>.

⁶⁰ The timing indicated here would mean that a compliant implementer would initiate licensing discussions no later than when it begins to practice the standard, a fair and reasonable way to limit the period of unlicensed practice.

⁶¹ Note that these are the reciprocal of the responsibilities SEP negotiation guidelines routinely place on SEP holders in the bilateral context, *e.g.*, to determine which products of the implementer infringe which of its SEPs, and to provide sufficient information to the implementer to allow it to determine if it is infringing.

⁶² This standard for assessing the implementer’s claim that it was not aware of the pool’s existence is important to foreclose the possibility that the implementer’s purposeful ignorance could be used as indicating good faith when purposeful ignorance clearly is bad faith.

- The patent pool (and its SEP holders) should be entitled to seek, and courts should have the ability to grant, an injunction against further infringement, taking into account all other relevant factors.
- Fulfilling its responsibilities noted above is necessary but not sufficient for an implementer to be characterized as a willing licensee.
 - After fulfilling the responsibilities described above, and to continue to be characterized as a willing licensee the implementer must continue to work actively, and in good faith, in the same manner in which it would act in pursuing a commercial opportunity it sought to reach an agreement.⁶³
 - For example, even where an implementer fulfills its responsibilities both to educate itself about a relevant patent pool and also to initiate contact with the pool to obtain a license – or where the patent pool initiated contact with the implementer – the implementer would lose its status as “willing” if it then pursued a course of conduct indicating a policy of delay, or otherwise acted in a manner inconsistent with a good faith intent to attempt to conclude a license in the same manner it would in a commercial negotiation in which it sought to reach an agreement.
 - In license negotiations with the patent pool, an implementer must start from the position that the patent pool’s rates and terms are FRAND. An implementer may try to establish that it is sufficiently different from every other patent pool licensee that the pool’s terms are not FRAND for it; but an implementer cannot begin negotiations as if starting from a blank slate—that is, as if the license terms had not already been validated—or simply reserve to itself the right to determine what is FRAND for the patent pool.⁶⁴
- In any court proceeding between an implementer and a patent pool (or its SEP holders) where the patent pool has met a threshold of reasonably wide acceptance in the market the implementer would have the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption and the burden of convincing the tribunal that it has succeeded.
- If the implementer fails to meet its burden, the patent pool (or its SEP holders) should be entitled to seek, and courts should have the ability to grant, an injunction against further infringement, taking into account all other relevant factors as well.

⁶³ Of course, the patent pool and/or its SEP holders also must continue to work actively and in good faith throughout the process, in the same manner in which it would act in pursuing a commercial opportunity in which it sought to reach an agreement.

⁶⁴ “Huawei’s stance has always been that they are willing to enter into what Huawei contend is a FRAND licence. . . Huawei have always reserved to themselves the right to determine what was FRAND at least in respect of the scope of the licence.” *Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd.* [2017] EWHC (Pat) 2988 (Birss J.) at ¶ 706.